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Louisiana Mineral Code Article 122: 
The Concept of Mutuality 





An oil and gas lease is, by its very nature and by definition, at least 
judicial definition, a cooperative joint venture between the lessor and lessee 
for the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas from the land.2 It is a 
synallagmatic contract out of which both parties intend and contemplate 
obtaining benefits. The controlling intentions of the parties, as manifested 
in a lease, is to make the extraction of oil and gas from the premises 
of 
mutual advantage and profit.4 Thus, the relationship between lessor and 
lessee is contractual. However, as in any contract, it is not only that which 
is expressly set out in the contract which governs that relationship, but there 
are matters that are "implied" as well.6 As Judge (later Supreme Court 
Justice) Van Devanter stated in the landmark case of Brewster v. Lanyon 
Zinc Co.: 
"whatever is necessary to the accomplishment of that which is 
expressly contracted to be done is part and parcel of the contract, 
though not specified."' 
Also, an underlying principle of an oil and gas lease is that of 
cooperation between the parties to that contract.8 This is based not purely 
upon oil and gas law but rather general contract law. That is, covenants 
implied but not explicitly spelled out in oil and gas leases reflect a broader 
principle of law applicable to all contractual arrangements - the principle of 
cooperation found in the law of contracts.9 This principle requires that 
parties to a contract cooperate in order to carry out the purposes of the 
agreement and is based upon the reasonable expectations of the parties 
1 
Partner -Ottinger, Hebert & Sikes, L.L.P., Lafayette, Louisiana 
2 Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 603 So.2d 166 (La. 1992) and Henry v. Ballard 
& 
Cordell Corp., 418 So.2d 1334 (La. 1982) and the authority cited therein. See also, Harrell, 
Developments in Non-Regulatory Oil 
& 
Gas Law, 30 INST. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 311 
(1979). 
3 
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1908. 
4 Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905). 
5 
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1908. See Frey, 603 So.2d at 172, and Odom v. Union 
Producing Co., 243 La. 48, 141 So.2d 649 (1961). 
6 Louisiana Civil Code Article 2054. 
7 
id. at 809. See also McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So.2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 
1962), cert denied 244 La. 128, 150 So.2d 588 (1962). 
8 
Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, Sec. 802.1. 
9 Williams and Meyers, §802. 
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when they enter into an agreement, as well as the ethical concepts of 
conduct.'o As pointed out, 
the requirement of cooperation may properly be said to impose a duty 
in addition to that imposed by the terms of the express promise." 
This idea or concept of cooperation has generally been considered the 
main basis for the imposition ofwhat are referred to as implied covenants in 
contracts in general, and in oil and gas leases in particular 2 
From the recognition of the existence of implied covenants comes the 
problem of interpreting how they affect the obligations ofparties to the oil 
and gas lease contract and how such obligations have served to create the 
"reasonable and prudent operator" standard imposed on all leases; that is, 
that the lessee must perform his obligations under the lease contract in good 
faith and as a reasonably prudent operator on behalf of and for the mutual 
benefit of both himself and his lessor.'
3 
As stated, the basis of this reasonable and prudent operator standard 
with which a lessee must comply and the recognition that implied covenants 
are an integral part of any oil and gas lease is based, in most jurisdictions, 
upon this concept of cooperation. Here in Louisiana, however, it is not 
necessary to resort to the broad principles of common law contract and 
equity law. Instead, we resort to our Civil Code, the basis for all of our 
laws. The obligations of the lessor to deliver the leased premises to the 
lessee, to refrain from disturbing the lessee's possession and to perform the 
lease contract in good faith, all obligations of the lessor specifically set out 
in Louisiana Mineral Code Article 119, are simply the reiteration of any 
lessor's obligations based upon the provisions of the Civil Code.14 The 
general law of leases, in our law for almost 200 years, is the basis for the 
law of oil and gas leases. In Louisiana, the oil and gas lease has always 
been interpreted in light of the Civil Code's provisions relating to predial 
leases.' 
5 
In fact, Louisiana Mineral Code Article 2 specifically provides 
that the provisions of the Mineral Code are "supplementary to those of the 
Civil Code" and, to the extent that the Mineral Code does not expressly or 
impliedly address a particular situation, resort must be had to the Civil 
10 Williams and Meyers, §802.1. 
11 Patterson, "Constructive Conditions in Contracts," 42 Colum. L. Rev. 903. 
12 However, some authorities suggest that the principle of cooperation may be an 
ill-founded basis for imposing the prudent operator standard upon lessees. See discussion 
infra. 
13 Louisiana Mineral Code Article 122. 
14 Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2475 and 2692. 
15 Davis v. Lassiter, 242 La. 735, 138 So.2d 558 (1962); Williams v. Humble Oil & 
Refining Co., 290 F.Supp. 408 (E.D. La. 1968), affirmed 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), 
rehearing denied, 435 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971). See also, 
Frey, supra at 172. 
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Code. " 
In the same vein, the obligations of the mineral lessee found in 
Article 122, wherein the lessee is obligated to perform the contract in good 
faith and to develop and operate the property as a reasonable and prudent 
operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor, are likewise based 
on provisions of the Civil Code that provide that any lessee must enjoy the 
thing leased as a "good administrator".' 7 That is the basis in Louisiana for 
the implied obligations imposed upon the lessee, to act as the proverbial 
"reasonable and prudent operator". In fact, as the late noted and well 
respected Judge Rubin stated in Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. 
[v]iewed in this light, [i.e. that of the "good administrator" standard 
established in the Civil Code] the lessee's duty to act as a good 
administrator is not a separate and distinct obligation imposed in 
addition to the implied obligations announced by the Louisiana courts: 
it is the basic obligation of the lessee and all of the implied obligations 
already drawn are merely elaborations or reflections of it." 
Professor Patrick Martin of the LSU law faculty and a noted author 
in 
the field of oil and gas law throughout the country, suggests that the oil and 
gas lease, being a contract, establishes certain covenants and/or agreements 
by and between the parties and that the implied obligations imposed upon 
a 
lessee actually arise in the context ofattempting to determine whether or not 
the lessee has fulfilled the covenants to which he has agreed in the 
contract. 19 Therefore, it has been argued that the implied covenants creating 
the standard ofprudent operation do not arise as a matter of extending the 
conscious intention of the lessor and lessee to cover matters not mentioned 
in the agreement, but as a matter of determining the duties that should be 
incident to the relation of the parties.
20 
It is true that the search by any court, in dealing with questions of oil 
and gas leases, and, indeed, any contract, is to determine the true intentions 
of the parties. However, it is submitted that the "good administrator" or the 
"reasonable and prudent operator" standard is probably never consciously 
made a specific part of the lease contract by the parties. It is intrinsically 
part and parcel of any such contract. That is, it is doubtful that the parties to 
an oil and gas lease specifically intend to, say, provide that the lessee will 
develop the lands in a particular manner, by drilling a certain number of 
wells or, say, market production to a certain purchaser or under certain 
16 Louisiana Mineral Code Article 2. 
17 Louisiana Civil Code Article 2710. 
18 290 F. Supp. at p. 414. 
19 Martin, A Modern Look atImplied Covenantsto Explore,Develop,andMarket Under 
MineralLeases, 27 Sw. Legal Fdn. Oil 
& 
Gas Inst., 177 (1976). 
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terms. In fact, they seldom address these issues; and, most printed lease 
forms deal very little with the obligations of the parties after production is 
established. Of course, this is so because in almost every such situation, the 
lessee and lessor simply cannot determine, when they enter the lease, how 
it 
should be operated in the future. However, it can hardly be said that both 
parties, when entering into the contract, did not fully expect that any 
operations thereunder would be pursued in such a manner as to fulfill the 
expectations of the parties to the contract, i.e. for their mutual advantage. 
Furthermore, it is this author's thoughts that the obligation of the lessee 
to work not only for his own benefit but also that of his lessor, has some 
basis in the jurisprudential and legislative intentions evidenced over the 
years to impose greater contractual obligations on the party to the contract 
who is in the better position to fulfill them. Thus, we have the vast array of 
cases dealing with what are referred to as contracts ofadhesion.21 In oil and 
gas matters, the nature of the oil and gas business lends itself to such 
a 
situation since the lessee is almost always in the unique position ofhaving 
virtually all the knowledge and also the control regarding the matters ofthe 
lease, e.g. drilling, completing, producing, marketing, developing and 
exploring. This is so because of the nature of the business, i.e. geology, 
contracts with oil and gas purchasers, the effects of faulting, 3-D seismic, 
production rates and the like. Except in the few cases of large, sophisticated 
landowner/lessors, it is the lessee, and (generally) only the lessee, who 
knows enough about these matters to deal with them. The lessor and lessee 
are not always on an equal footing. The lessor leases his land and gives the 
lessee the right to retain what might be considered a disproportionate part of 
the production to be obtained (e.g. 75% or 80%), in exchange for and with 
the expectation that the lessee will perform under the contract in such 
a 
manner as to benefit both of them. Otherwise, the lessee, because of his 
superior and unique knowledge and capabilities, could take complete 
advantage of the lessor. Therefore, the reasonable and prudent operator 
standard, with all that implies, has been imposed on the lessee. He is, ifyou 
will, the "captain of the ship". 
In fact, Professor Martin states that the law of implied covenants does 
not actually arise from the intent of the parties, nor from an analogous 
principle in contract law but 
21 See, for example, Golz v.Children's Bureau ofNew Orleans, Inc., 326 So.2d 865 (La. 
1976) at 869 wherein the court stated that "[b]roadly defined, 
a 
contract of adhesion is a 
standard contract, usually 
in
printed form, prepared by aparty ofsuperior b rgaining power 
for adherence or rejection of the weaker party. Often in small print, these contracts 
sometimes raise 
a 
question as to whether or not the weaker party actually consented to the 
terms. See LSA-C.C. Arts. 1766, 1811; 
S. 
Litvinoff, 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise-
Obligations (Book), 
§
194, pp. 346-349 (1969)." See also the discussion concerning the 
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[r]ather it grows out of an attempt on the part of the courts to promote 
what they perceive to be justice and fair dealing by requiring lessees to 
adhere to a particular norm ofconduct, the prudent operator standard.22 
Also, it should be kept in mind that the prudent operator standard is 
apparently not one of merely good faith. It is an objective and not 
a subjective test. That is, the lessee may be in good faith in its assessment as 
to whether or not, for example, it is appropriate that a second or third well 
should be drilled for the development of the leased premises but 
nevertheless, he may well lose the lease for not meeting the prudent 
operator test 
if 
it can properly be shown that a prudent operator would have 
drilled such a well or wells, based upon an objective assessment of all 
relevant facts.23 
Under these standards, it is a valid question to determine whether or 
not a mineral lessee is held to a higher standard than in most other 
contractual relationships, at least in connection with the cases or situations 
dealing with development and further exploration. That is, good faith is the 
usual test to be used in general contract law. Therefore, it would appear that 
the situation regarding the prudent operator standard is, in fact, one where 
courts apparently feel that lessees are in a better position to negotiate and 
have more control over the relationship created by the oil and gas lease and, 
consequently, will look to these matters for the enforcement of the promises 
made by the lessee to the lessor and will attempt to "protect" the lessor 
under these circumstances.24 
It is interesting to note that Professor Martin suggests that perhaps the 
test should, indeed, be one of good faith, recognizing that the prudent 
operator standard was established in the very early part of the century when 
the only motive of lessees, especially corporate lessees, was, or at least was 
expected to be, profit. Thus, if a corporate lessee saw that there was an 
opportunity to make profit, it was expected to go forward and, for example, 
drill a well in order to make such profit for both the lessor and lessee. 
Consequently, instead of the good faith standard recognized in general 
contract law, the prudent operator was held to a greater standard based upon 
whether or not, despite good faith, the well should have been drilled 
if
there 
was a reasonable chance for profit to be made. Instead, Professor Martin 
suggests that in the latter part of the century, particularly in the last twenty 
or thirty years, many more factors become important, especially to 
a 22 Martin, Sw. LegalFdn. at p. 197-198. 
23 See, for example, Wier v. Grubb,228 La. 254, 82 So.2d I (1955); Carterv. Arkansas-
LouisianaGas Co., 213 La. 1028, 36 So.2d 26 (1948); Gennusov. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 
203 La. 559, 14 So.2d 495 (1943); 
Coyle
v. NorthAmerican Oil Consolidated, 201 La. 99, 9 
So.2d 473 (1942); Caddo Oil 
&
MiningCo. v. Producer'sOil Co., 134 La. 701, 64 So. 684 
(1914). See also, Williams 
& 
Meyers, § 806.3. 
24 See, Kuntz, 25 Okla. L.Rev. 484 (1972), supra. 
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corporation, such as public opinion, environmental concerns, governmental 
regulations, and other such matters. Thus, a corporation may or may not do 
things that it might otherwise do because of such considerations and, 
therefore, the test, he suggests, should be whether the lessee has acted in 
good faith and had a reasonable basis for its judgment.25 
Indeed, a review of this situation reveals that many times it may be that 
a lessee might be forced to give up what it considers long-term stability 
arising out of what he considers more reasonable but perhaps slower 
development of a lease, for the rapid profitability expected by the lessor. 
The question which arises is whether or not this may lead to waste and the 
drilling of unnecessary wells, the prevention ofwhich are the hallmarks of 
our conservation Act.2626 This may be particularly relevant since oil and gas 
are presumably finite resources and quick exploitation thereof may not 
necessarily be the most prudent method by which to develop and produce 
them. 
Despite the various theories that exist concerning the basis for the 
reasonable and prudent operator standard, nevertheless, there is no question 
that such a standard exists and one with which a lessee must comply in 
connection with its operations under an oil and gas lease. In Louisiana, that 
standard is stated as part of the statutory scheme of the Louisiana Mineral 
Code under Article 122 (hereinafter referred to merely as Article 122). That 
article states 
A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he 
is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to develop and operate 
the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit 
of himself and his lessor. Parties may stipulate what shall constitute 
reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee. 
The author specifically refers you to the phrase wherein the lessee 
is 
required to operate the lease for the "mutual benefit" ofboth the lessor and 
lessee. That is the portion ofArticle 122 which is the main subject of this 
paper and the point upon which the author intends to focus. Much has been 
written concerning the various implied obligations that have been 
recognized (or imposed?) over the years by the courts, such as full 
exploration and development, marketing, and the like. However, this paper 
intends to concentrate and focus upon the issue of "mutuality", of which 
those other obligations form only a specific and, by now, well-defined part. 
Over the years, many lessors have argued that the relationship is more 
in the nature of a fiduciary one (or certainly have styled pleadings and 
arguments as such if not utilizing those exact words). However, no court 
has gone quite so far as to agree with that contention and, in fact, 
25 Martin, 27 Sw. Legal Fdn. at 205 (195). 
26 La.R.S. 30:9. 
- 34 -
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Article 122 specifically states that the lessee is not under a fiduciary 
obligation to his lessor. However, the courts do seem to recognize a 
"higher" standard or duty than what might exist in other contracts. 
Of course, a fiduciary relationship is one where one party must put the 
other party's interest primary and may even have to suffer some detriment 
for the benefit of the other. In effect, a fiduciary is basically a person who 
undertakes to act in the interest of another person. Under such 
circumstances, by acting in the interest of the other person, he must do what 
is in the best interest of such other person, even, under certain 
circumstances, at his own cost. Suffice it to say that it implies the utmost of 
good faith and fair dealing.27 
Although speaking at the time of the fiduciary relationship, and 
although we realize that the reasonable and prudent operator standard 
prevails in Louisiana and that there is no such fiduciary relationship 
between a lessor and lessee, nevertheless, the underlying basis or reason for 
our current rule may have been said best by Professor Scott in his address to 
the California Bar Association in 1949: 
Whenever the owner of an interest in oil and gas has a power with 
respect to another person's interest in oil and gas, the courts are quick 
to imply a duty in connection with the exercise of such power. Power 
begets responsibilities and duties. A fiduciary principle becomes 
applicable. The person having the power is restricted in his conduct; 
he is not permitted to base his conduct exclusively on self-interest. He 
must give consideration to the effect of his conduct upon the interest 
owned by another with regard to which he has a power.28 
Having recognized the general basis for the reasonable and prudent 
operator standard imposed on lessees and that the oil and gas lessee has 
imposed on him certain implied obligations; we will now discuss the effect 
of these on lessees both in general as well as in certain specific situations. 
There have developed over the years several well recognized 
obligations which are binding on the lessee, even though not spelled out in 
the lease. These are the implied obligations of reasonable development, 
further exploration, protection against drainage, diligence in marketing and 
restoration of surface. 29 In fact, these have been so well recognized that 
they are specifically enumerated and discussed in the official Comment to 
27 H. Williams, The FiduciaryPrinciplein the Law of Oil and Gas, 13 S.W. Legal 
Foundation Oil and Gas Institute, 201 (1962). See also, Kaplanv. Fine,643 So.2d 438 (La. 
App. 3d Cir. 1994) and Office ofthe CommissionerofInsurancev. HartfordFireInsurance 
Company,623 So.2d 37 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ denied, 635 So.2d 1131 (1994) for 
a 
discussion regarding the meaning of a fiduciary. 
28 H. Williams, The Fiduciary Principle in the Law of Oil andGas, 13 Sw. Legal Fdn. 
Oil 
& 
Gas Inst., 201 at 374 (1962). 
29 See the official Comment under Louisiana Mineral Code Article 122. 
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Article 122 in the Mineral Code and are the subject of numerous articles 
and commentaries. 30 These are not, except perhaps by reference, the main 
thrust of this paper. You are referred to the various excellent articles 
written on them for specific discussions on these various topics. It is this 
author's experience that, apparently since these are so well known, many 
lessees or at least landmen feel that these are the only implied obligations 
imposed on a lessee. It is also this author's experience that many lessees 
are familiar with the phrase "reasonable and prudent operator" and are 
perhaps of the opinion that fulfillment of aforementioned specific and 
recognized obligations, without more, satisfies the reasonable and prudent 
operator test. That is not so and it is because of that thinking that the author 
has included such a detailed discussion above about the history of this 
matter and the development ofand reason for the standard and the basis for 
the imposition of the obligation placed on lessee to be a "good 
administrator". Recognizing the reason for a rule often allows one to 
understand and determine its applicability to various situations. It appears, 
at least to this author, that many lessees look at this "list" as an exclusive 
one and as defining what a reasonable and prudent operator is. Instead, 
however, a lessee should look to the general rule or obligation and view 
these specific, enumerated ones as merely illustrative examples thereof. 
The cases and commentaries dealing with these matters should be reviewed 
critically for discussions about the reasonable and prudent operator standard 
in order to determine how a court will apply that standard to the situation at 
hand. 
The essence of the rule is that a lessee must conduct all of its 
operations in connection with the lease, for the mutual benefit of both 
himself and his lessee - the key words in this sentence being "all 
operations" and "mutual benefit". It is not only in development, 
exploration, marketing and the like that a lessee must consider the position 
of the lessor; rather, it is in the entirety of his operations. It seems that often 
lessees decide on a particular course ofaction based solely, or almost solely, 
on self-serving considerations - examples are unitization, additional drilling 
(both to prevent drainage and in development, and exploration), marketing, 
and the like 
-
and only after having made these decisions, and even after 
beginning the implementation thereof, do they consider the effect this will 
have on the lease in question and their lessors in particular. This may be 
akin to "shutting the gate after the horses are out". Granted, in most cases, 
the interest of the lessor and the lessee will coincide; but not always, as will 
be shown in more detail below. The point of this 
-
and if this paper can 
make any lasting impression 
-
is that the considerations as to the effect on 
the lease and the lessor's interest should be dealt with before and not after 
30 See William & Meyers, supra §§ 801, et seq. and matters cited therein. See also, 
Willey, The Lessee's Implied Obligationsunderthe Mineral Code, 23 L.S.U. Inst. on Min. 
Law 155 (1976). 
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these decisions are made and action taken. Remember, the test is an 
objective one - that is, even if the lessee is in perfect good faith still, ifthe 
action taken is found not to be in the best interest ofboth the lessee and the 
lessor, or at least 
if 
it is found to be for the lessee's benefit at the expense of 
the lessor, the reasonable and prudent operator standard may not be met and 
the lease may be placed in jeopardy. This is the idea this author is trying to 
convey in the title of this paper by use of the term "mutuality". A lessee 
simply cannot make decisions with impunity 
if 
they are made in a vacuum, 
so to speak, and without a factor in such decision-making process being the 
effect it will have on the lessor's interest. 
Having now recognized that there is a standard set by which a lessee 
must conduct himself and having reviewed the basis and reason for the rule, 
we now turn to the more difficult issue of just what is meant by insuring 
compliance with that standard as it applies to "mutuality". First, all courts 
dealing with these matters make it clear they will determine such 
compliance or non-compliance on a case by case basis in light of all of the 
circumstances at hand." Obviously, there can be no hard and fast rule 
because of the nature of the obligation. That is, for example, a court 
determining, say, whether an operator has sufficiently explored the leased 
premises must necessarily review how many wells have been drilled, 
whether the wells on or off the leased premises, what horizons have been 
explored, etc. No two situations dealing with these matters are alike so it 
is 
obvious why each separate situation must be reviewed individually. 
Unfortunately, perhaps, this may allow a court to feel more free to decide 
on the basis of "gut feeling" rather than on more technical definitions and 
pre-set conduct with which a lessee may be more familiar. Therefore, 
it 
becomes even more important to the lessee's position that he not only insure 
such compliance but also insure the clear appearance thereof. 
These matters can perhaps best be discussed and clarified by using 
a 
few examples. In some of the instances discussed, there may not be a clear 
answer, but you should see, from the examples, what the concerns are and 
why more thought should be given by lessees to the "good administrator" 
standard and the effect these standards may have on any action a lessee may 
take in connection with a lease. It may also shed some light on how we, as 
attorneys, should advise clients and try cases dealing with these matters. 
We will start with a situation that was the subject of a very recent 
decision by the Second Circuit Court ofAppeals, Mattie Connell Caskey, 
31 See, Broussardv. NorthcottExplorationCo., Inc., 481 So.2d 125 (La. 1986). In fact, 
the test for the prudent operator standard is generally, "whatever in the circumstanceswould 
be reasonably expected of operators ofordinary prudence, having regard to the interest of 
both Lessor and Lessee". See, Brown, The Law ofOil &GasLeases, §16.02. Caddo Oil & 
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et alv. Kelley Oil Company,et al.32 In that case, the plaintiffs owned a tract 
of land covered by an oil, gas and mineral lease granted in 1972. Kelley Oil 
Company ("Kelley") was not the operator but owned an undivided interest 
in that lease. There were several wells producing on the surface of the 
leased premises (the "Connell Tract"), which wells were accessed by a 
locked gate on the north boundary of the tract and an unimproved road. 
Kelley also apparently owned a lease on a tract situated to the south of the 
Connell Tract. The lease form at issue was a Bath's Form Louisiana 
Spec. 14-BR1-2A-PX (10/65) which contains a provision in the granting 
clause thereof that is common in many leases and which effectively stated 
that the lessee could use the leased premises in connection with its 
operations on the leased premises "oron any adjacentlands". Despite the 
language in the lease, for some six years, Kelley apparently asked 
permission from the owners of the Connell Tract for use of the surface to 
build a road to gain access to the tract to the south for the drilling of a well 
thereon. Such permission was denied but, nevertheless, the gate was torn 
down, trees felled, ditches improved and a shale surface was laid on the 
previously unimproved road which was extended to the drillsite location 
on 
the tract to the south of the Connell Tract. It was not clear who did this but 
Kelley began using the road for access to its drillsite on the tract located 
south of the Connell Tract. The owners of the Connell Tract filed suit 
against Kelley to enjoin it from entering the tract "solely" for access to an 
adjoining tract and for damages. At the hearing on the injunction, Kelley's 
defense was that the lease on the Connell Tract specifically granted the 
lessee the right to use the surface of the leased premises to construct roads 
in connection with mineral operations on "adjacent lands". The District 
Court upheld Kelley's right to do this and denied the injunction. However, 
on appeal, that decision was reversed. In its decision, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals referred specifically to Article 122 and emphasized the 
portion thereof concerning the requirement that the lessee develop the 
leased premises "for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor" and, 
in 
fact, elevated that duty or obligation of "mutuality" perhaps a notch higher 
than it had been taken before when it stated that 
[t]he duty of mutual benefit under R.S. 31:122 is 
a 
matter of public 
policy governing the burden that real rights may impose on the property. 
The duty may be contractually defined, but not abrogated. 
The court noted that the term "adjacent lands" did not express a clear 
and unambiguous intent of the parties "to define mutual benefit as it relates 
to the use of [the] leased premises as access, and nothing more, to adjacent 
lands" and found "that it was incumbent upon Kelley to demonstrate, by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence, what benefit 
(if 
any) accrued to the 
Connells from Kelley's use of the surface for no other purpose than as 
a 
32 La. App., Second Cir., Docket No. 30278; Feb., 1998. 
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road to the Crichton tract." 
Thus, we see that the obligation of the lessee to operate the lease as a 
"good administrator" and for the "mutual benefit" of both himself and his 
lessor, has now become a matter ofpublic policy. Of course, 
if 
a particular 
matter is considered public policy, mere contracts between parties cannot 
abrogate it.33 
From a close reading of the court's decision, it is fairly obvious that the 
court was not impressed with the manner in which Kelley dealt with its 
lessors and this case stands not only for the proposition cited above, but also 
for the fact that, as is often the case, "bad facts make bad law". 34 However, 
it also indicates the manner in which these types of cases should be tried, 
perhaps in anticipation of a court imposing certain unanticipated 
requirements ofproof. It appears crucial to the decision that Kelley failed 
to put on evidence regarding any positive effect its operations may have had 
on the Connell Tract. Kelley apparently relied solely or almost solely on 
the language of the lease wherein it was specifically granted the right to use 
the surface ofthe Connell Tract in connection with operations on "adjacent 
lands". With all due respect, that would seem to have been enough since 
the language is fairly clear, at least in this author's view. However, it may 
now appear necessary to show not only that you have a certain right under 
the lease but also how, in the exercise of that right, the lessor will be 
"benefited". Also, elevating the obligation of "mutuality" to the status 
of 
public policy presumably now means that, despite the introductory phrase 
of the second sentence ofArticle 122 (to the effect that the parties are free 
to determine what will constitute reasonable and prudent operations), such 
an agreement between the parties will be upheld only to the extent that 
it 
does not conflict with the higher "public policy" standard of "mutual 
benefit". 
33 La. Mineral Code Article 3. 
34 It is interesting to note that the further argument regarding the reasonableness of 
Kelley's use ofthe surface was also placed at issue and the court noted that the other lessees 
who were operating on the Connell Tract (i.e. the leased premises) were much less intrusive 
than that of Kelley and that Kelley's operations were much more invasive, damaged more of 
the property and "diminished the desirability ofthe tract for the Connells' future retirement 
homes". The court further found that the testimony by the Connells showed that the 
Crichton tract (i.e. the drill site tract to the south of the Connell Tract) could have been 
accessed by an alternate route. Thus, the court found that Kelley failed to prove by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence that building the subject road across the Connell Tract, only 
for access to operations on another tract of land, conferred any benefit whatsoever upon the 
Connells. (The court noted, for example, that there was no showing that the road in question 
would facilitate development ofother wells on the Connell Tract or that the well that Kelley 
drilled would be unitized with any of the leased premises.) The author questions whether the 
same result would have been reached had all the lessees of the Connell Tract or, at least, the 
operator, 
joined 
Kelley in its operations. Presumably not, based on the language the court 
used, but one cannot help but wonder. 
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Obviously, there are a number of arguments that Kelley could have 
made regarding the benefits of its operations that would have inured to the 
owners of the Connell Tract. For example, drilling operations within the 
immediate vicinity thereof could be presumed to be "beneficial" in that 
drilling such a well would obviously influence or have an impact or effect 
upon the tract and the development thereof; for example, by unitization of 
portions of the tract with the subject well. (Of course, whether that impact 
is beneficial may not be known until the well is drilled.) 35 In fact, it is 
submitted that the reason that the phrase "on adjacent lands" is included 
in printed lease forms may well be the fact that parties recognize, particularly 
in light of unitization, that drilling on lands "adjacent" to or "adjoining" the 
leased premises is, in a way, development of the leased premises. A lessee 
will, it is presumed, attempt to develop a geologic "play" by drilling at what 
he feels is the optimum location for success. Furthermore, he presumably 
is 
familiar with his obligation to prevent drainage from the leased premises 
and 
if
the well were successful, would presumably unitize it with the leased 
premises, 
if 
and as appropriate. This could36 certainly benefit the leased 
premises. Given the nature ofunitization and the fact that almost all units 
include more than one tract of land, are not the odds fairly good that an 
"adjacent" or "adjoining" tract will be included in the unit? Is not the hope 
ofparticipation in production by unitization sufficient reason for a lessor to 
include this clause in a lease? 
Also, could not a well on this adjacent tract "set up" a well on the 
leased premises? For example, ifthis well is drilled, even if a dry hole and 
even 
if 
the leased premises were not included in the unit for the well 
(something that would not be known, usually, until the well is actually 
drilled), it might reveal that the optimum location for another, perhaps 
better, well is on the leased premises. The list could go on but it would 
appear obvious that a well on an "adjacent" tract of land could very well 
benefit the leased premises.37 The beneficial effect may not be known until 
35 This makes such obligation akin to the implied obligation of further exploration in that 
the "benefit" to be realized by fulfillment of such an obligation (ifany) to, for example, drill 
an exploratory well will not be known until after the well is drilled. However, in such a 
situation (i.e. further exploration), since the lessor would have no exposure for well costs, 
the "benefit" may well be solely to the lessor if the result is a dry hole. Nevertheless, since 
the test is an objective one, based not on the lessee 
himself 
but rather on the ubiquitous 
"reasonable and prudent operator", and since the lessee's interest, including the chance of 
success, profit to be made, etc. must be considered in determining whether the obligation 
exists, then for a court, to impose that obligation, it must find that the lessee, too, will 
"benefit"; therefore, the result should not be one-sided. 
36 Is the proper word here "could" or "would"? Can the lessee simply show that the 
operation "could" or "might" benefit the lessor or must he show a definite, positive effect i.e. 
"would"? The author suggests that the former should be sufficient, especially with the 
availability ofunitization, at least in this situation. 
37 For an interesting discussion concerning the words "adjoining" and "adjacent" in the 
context of oil and gas leases. See Arceneaux v. Shell Oil Co., Docket No. 96-CV-753 
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the well is drilled, but shouldn't the lessee be allowed to drill it especially 
since the lease allows it? Could this not be similar to the famous "sale ofa 
hope"? If one buys the catch of a 
fisherman's 
next cast, is he not bound, 
regardles of the amount of fish caught? And if so, is not this clause 
similar? Further, it seems somewhat illogical that Kelley should have had 
to put on evidence to prove the obvious, especially when the right to do this 
is spelled out in (despite the court's finding to the contrary, what, it 
is 
submitted, is) clear language. 
It is noted that this decision is now being appealed to the Louisiana 
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, even if it is ultimately overturned, it should 
be viewed as a definite indication of how our courts will deal with this issue 
of mutuality. In any event, a lessee should, in all instances, be prepared to 
show how the action, or inaction, taken by him benefits not only his own 
interest but also that of his lessor. 
Another situation similar to the Connellcase, at least regarding the 
effect of specific language in a lease not overriding the reasonable and 
prudent operator standard, is that found to be the subject of Dawes v. 
38 Hale. In fact, that case was cited with approval by the Second Circuit in 
the Connellcase. In Dawes, the lease in question originally covered eighty 
(80) acres and contained a retained acreage provision, a fairly common 
clause found in many printed lease forms which provides generally that 
in 
the case of cancellation or termination of the lease for any cause, the lessee 
nonetheless has the right to retain under the terms of the lease forty (40) 
acres around any then drilling or producing well. In that case, the lessee 
had drilled three 
(3) 
wells in the extreme northwest portion of the eighty 
(80) leased premises which wells, it was apparently recognized, drained 
only two to three acres. The lessee released the lease as to one forty (40) 
acre tract but retained the remaining forty (40) acres and relied on the 
aforestated provision in the lease for his refusal to release any portion 
(1997). See also, Acree v. Shell, 548 F.Supp. 1150 (M.D. La. 1982). 
38 421 So.2d 1208 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982). 
39 For example, paragraph 3 of a Bath Form 42 CPM New South Louisiana Revised Six 
(6) Pooling form states, in part: "[1]n the event of the forfeiture of this lease for any cause, 
except for failure to pay royalties according to the requirements of this lease, Lessee shall 
have the right to retain around each well then producing oil, gas or other minerals or being 
drilled or worked on or shut in under Paragraph 6 
hereof, 
the number of acres fixed and 
located by or in accordance with the spacing or unit or proration allowable order of any 
Regulatory Body of the State of Louisiana or of the United States under which said well 
is 
being drilled or produced, or ifsaid well is located on a pooled unit, then Lessee may retain 
all of the acreage comprising said pooled unit and ifno spacing or prorati n allowable order 
has been issued nor any pooled unit established, then Lessee shall have the right to retain 
forty (40) acres surrounding each oil well then producing or being drilled or worked on, and 
one hundred sixty (160) acres around each gas or gas condensate well then producing, or 
being drilled or worked on or shut in under Paragraph 6 
hereof, 
each ofsuch tracts to be in 
as near a square from as is practicable." 
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thereof. The issue before the court, of course, was "whether the retained 
acreage provision in the printed form lease should be construed to preclude 
plaintiffs' claim that lessees have violated their statutory obligation to 
prudently develop the leased property".40 
The court reviewed the history of the "good administrator" obligation 
of a lessee and stated that "[a]ny clause purporting to limit a primary 
obligation of the lease should be carefully examined to determine if the 
parties clearly intended such result". 4 1 Further, the court quoted the Fifth 
Circuit in its upholding of Judge Rubin's decision in Williams v. Humble 
Oil & Refining Company that "[i]t would require a clear and unequivocal 
clause in a lease to convince the court that the lessor intended to sacrifice 
that basic obligation [to act as a good administrator] owed him by his 
lessee".42 The court in Dawes found that the acreage retention clause did 
not reflect a "clear, unmistakable, unequivocal intent to limit" the good 
administrator standard of the lessee and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed 
with their action. 
The significance of this case and, indeed, also, of the Connell case, is 
to show us rather clearly that despite what may be rather clear and 
seemingly unambiguous language in a lease, courts will nevertheless read 
that language in the context of the "greater" obligation of operating the 
lease as a "good administrator" and if the two conflict, the latter will 
prevail. Therefore, in making decisions regarding lease operations, a lessee 
may not simply resort to language in the lease. He must instead be 
thoroughly familiar with the reasonable operator standard and the 
significance of "mutuality" and insure compliance therewith. 
The next situation for discussion is that concerning well costs and 
particularly the payment thereof. As we all know, the lessor in an oil and 
gas lease expects to receive his benefits, i.e. his share of production in the 
form of royalty, "free of expenses".43 That is, in accordance with contract 
and well understood industry practices, the working or cost bearing interest 
owners bear all expenses in connection with operations on the land. That 
issue seems to be fairly well understood and, at least in more recent years, 
has not been the subject ofmuch litigation. However, there are cases which 
address the situation about which this author is interested. The issue in 
40 421 So.2d at 1210. 
41 421 at p.1211. 
42 432 F.2d at 177. Note that in 1970 when the Fifth Circuit upheld Judge Rubin's 
decision in the Williams case, the court apparently felt that such an obligation could be 
"sacrificed" (so long as the language doing so was "clear and unequivocal") whereas in the 
Connell case, decided this year, the court stated that this was a matter ofpublic policy, and 
therefore, it could not be "abrogated" or "sacrificed", no matter how clear the language. 
43 See Louisiana Mineral Code Article 80. 
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question is that which was the subject of Shanks v. Exxon Corporation" 
That case involved a situation where the lessee had acquired an oil and gas 
lease on a tract of land which was subsequently placed in a unit around 
a 
well as a result of which obligations accrued for the payment ofwell costs 
to the operator of the well. It is noted that the lessee in question was not the 
operator ofthe well and that the well was not drilled on the leased premises. 
Thus, the key ingredient to these situations is that of unitization and the 
obligation arising therefrom for the payment of well costs. The author notes 
that the applicable statute to this situation, La.R.S. 30:10, which is often 
referred to as the "risk fee" statute, was amended after the filing of that suit 
and therefore, its new provisions did not apply to the facts thereof. 
Nevertheless, the situation is worth discussing, particularly to compare it to 
the situation when the lessee and operator of the well on the drill site tract 
is 
also the lessee of the leased premises in the immediate vicinity ofthe well. 
In the Shanks case, Exchange Oil 
&
Gas Corporation ("Exchange") was the 
lessee of the leased premises which tract was in the vicinity of the tract 
upon which Exxon drilled its Tommy 
J. 
Strain No. I well. After the 
successful completion of the well, Exxon applied to the Commissioner 
of Conservation for a unit which resulted in the leased premises being included 
in the unit.45 Pursuant to the authority of La.R.S. 30:10, as it read at the 
time, Exxon withheld the proceeds ofproduction attributable to the leased 
premises until it recouped that tract's proportionate share of well costs. 
4 6 
Exchange paid royalties to the plaintiffs the for some time until it made the 
decision that the well would not "pay out" and elected to simply release the 
lease in order to be relieved of any further responsibility in connection 
therewith. Since that previously leased tract's share of well costs had not 
yet been fully recouped, Exxon continued withholding such costs from the 
share now owned by the plaintiffs in their capacity as unleased mineral 
owners. The plaintiffs sued TXP (as successor to Exchange's interest in the 
lease) for such well costs arguing that such costs were incurred during the 
existence of the lease and therefore, were the responsibility of the lessee. 
44 674 So.2d 473 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996), writdenied,679 So.2d 436 (1996). See also, 
Willis v. InternationalOil & Gas Corp., 541 So.2d 332 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989). 
45 It is noted that the lessee did not participate in nor consent to Exxon's drilling 
operations and did not participate in the unitization proceedings in any way, two significant 
factors the court noted in ruling for the lessee. However, the author questions whether such 
failure to participate, at least in the unitization hearing, may not itself have been a breach of 
the lessee's implied obligations under the lease, i.e. to properly and fairly represent the 
lessor before administrative bodies or, at least, to prevent drainage. See Breaux v. Pan 
American PetroleumCorp., supra,and Williams v. Humble Oil 
&
Refining Co., supra,and 
particularly the discussion thereof in the official Comment following Article 122 in the 
Louisiana Mineral Code. 
46 It is noted that there was no provision for a "risk fee" in the statute at the time as 
would be the case presently and therefore, the lessee would have been responsible for well 
costs, but only out of production. 
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Of course, TXP's defense was that it was relieved of this responsibility 
prospectively from the date of the release. Exchange argued that since 
Exxon could only recoup such funds by withholding production attributable 
to the tract in question, the obligation arose only as production was obtained 
and therefore, it had no obligation to continue paying for such well costs 
after the release. The court agreed with TXP and found that the release of 
the lease resulted in the discharge of any further obligations in connection 
therewith, including those dealing with the subject well costs. 4 7 
Again, although the author recognizes that the applicable statute has 
since been amended, nevertheless, slightly different circumstances could 
provide a different result. That is, it is common knowledge in the industry 
that a lessee will normally put a lease block together and acquire oil, gas 
and mineral leases covering a substantial area comprising what he feels is 
the prospective productive area in order to pursue the development and 
exploration of a geological idea or play. Before he can justify the 
expenditure ofwhat may be millions ofdollars to develop such a geological 
idea, it is necessary for him to protect his interest by the acquisition of 
leases over a large enough area to insure that, 
if
the prospect is a success, he 
will be the sole party (or, at least, sole lessee) to share in the production 
attributable thereto. Consequently, he may acquire leases covering, say, for 
purposes of this discussion, a contiguous thousand acres from, for example, 
ten different lessors. Suppose he drills his well in the center of the thousand 
acre block and unfortunately, the idea proves to be only marginally 
successful. An analysis of the logs, pressures, production, etc. may reveal 
to him that it is quite likely that the well, 
if 
it even reaches payout, will not 
be very profitable. Having been given the opportunity, by the acquisition 
of the leases, to pursue his idea and participate in the potential largesse that 
a successful well would create, would such a lessee who drills only the 
marginal well, then be free to release, for example, all of the leases except 
the drillsite lease, and then, once the non-drillsite tracts are included in 
a 
unit, recoup the now released tracts' share of well costs out ofproduction? 
Such 
a 
situation is, of course, different from the Shanks case. In this 
example, unlike the situation in Shanks, the lessee and the operator are one 
and the same; therefore, the lessee obviously "participated" in the drilling 
operations. Thus, the obligation (by agreement) to pay well costs may have 
been incurred while the lease was in effect. (However, the well was not 
on 
the complaining plaintiff 
s 
lands.) Also, ifthe unit was in effect at the time 
the well was drilled, the risk fee statute would now be applicable and could 
be used for 
a 
determination of participation prior to drilling, even if the 
lessee is not the operator. What if, however, there was but one lessee, no 
unit and an off-premises well was drilled and not the operator but a third 
47 The court cited the case ofDavis Oil Company v. SteamboatPetroleum Corporation, 
583 So.2d 139 (La. 1991) as controlling authority. 
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party landowner, as an interested party, called for the unit that ultimately 
included the leased premises? Could the lessee, under such circumstances, 
release the lease and retain the formerly leased lands' proportionate share of 
production for well costs? Would it be any different 
if 
the lessee had 
released the lease prior to the calling of the hearing for unitization, or 
during the pendency of the unitization proceedings? Most leases provide 
that a lessee may, at any time, release the lease and be relieved of any 
further obligations thereunder. It is submitted that, in the example given, 
despite such a release, the operator/lessee should not be allowed to recoup 
such well costs. It is admitted that that submission has not gone 
unchallenged. Discussions of this issue have been had with various other 
oil and gas attorneys in the state and many, 
if 
not most, have stated that the 
clear language in the lease regarding the right of the lessee to release it and 
be relieved of further responsibility settles this issue.48 It might, but no 
doubt Kelley thought that the "clear" language in its lease in the Connell 
case likewise settled the issue of use of the surface of the leased premises 
for operations on adjacent lands. The author is not unmindful of the fact 
that, in the example, after the release, there simply is no longer a lease in 
effect. Therefore, how would the landowner be paid 
-
as a royalty owner in 
the amount of the royalty provided for in the prior lease, or as an unleased 
owner or even some other way? 49 It is doubted that it would be as an 
unleased owner because then the prior lessor/landowner would "have his 
cake and eat it too", i.e. by receiving his share of the proceeds without 
paying his share of the costs.so The author has simply no concrete answer 
and, as yet, has not had to face the issue. The author is aware of one 
situation where this occurred but none of the landowners pursued it. It 
simply seems that, given the mandate ofArticle 122 and the requirement of 
mutuality, it can hardly be argued that such a lessee can have the benefit of 
the lease which allowed him to drill the well to test the prospect and then,
when it does not turn out as well as he expected, abandon the lessor solely 
for his own gain. Perhaps the remedy of the landowner is one for breach of 
the lease and resultant damages for failure to comply with the obligations 
of 
48 See Willis, supra,p. 344 when the court stated that "the plain wording of the lease 
specifically created the right to execute a release at any time". 
49 In Shanks, TXP, apparently recognizing the problem, reconvened against the plaintiffs 
(i.e. its 
prior 
lessors) averring that if the plaintiffs were successful in requiring TXP to pay 
the well costs in question, then TXP was entitled to its share ofthe production, subject to the 
payment of royalties to the plaintiffs under the previously existing lease. Thus, TXP 
requested that if the plaintiffs were successful, the court should declare the previous release 
void and ofno effect. Quere
-
is this "breathing new life into a dead horse"? 
50 La.R.S. 30:1 OA.2. See also Willis, supraand the cases cited therein, especially at 335, 
wherein the court stated that "to the extent that the Willises are co-owners ofthe minerals at 
issue, and have not participated in the expenses incurred in producing those minerals, they 
are not entitled to a proportionate share ofthe proceeds without paying a proportionate share 
of the expenses". 
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Article 122 but, of course, the breach (i.e. the actionable offense - the 
release) does not occur until after (or, at least, simultaneously with) the 
termination of the lease. As noted, the author does not have the answer to 
the question and it is conceded that the language regarding releases 
contained in most leases would ostensibly allow this. However, it 
is 
submitted that the matter is not free from doubt. It is suggested that there 
are problems with this issue. Of course, under such circumstances, the 
threat of loss of the lease is not present but perhaps a suit for damages 
would be available. Nevertheless, the issue is presented in order to 
evidence the kind of situation which may be envisioned by the obligation 
of 
mutuality mentioned in Article 122. 
Yet another issue anticipated as a concern is that dealing with 
unitization. This is not specifically mentioned in the official Comment to 
Article 122. However, it probably falls under the ambit of the obligation to 
prevent drainage. In fact, in Breaux v. PanAmerican PetroleumCorp.5 it 
was suggested that under certain circumstances, a lessee might be under a 
duty to unitize, or at least to attempt to unitize, the leased premises with an 
off-premises well draining the tract. It is submitted that the word "might" 
is 
probably no longer applicable in Louisiana law. Since unitization 
is available to prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells, and to in ure each 
tract's just and equitable share of production, it is submitted that 
representation of the lessor (and presumably himself, as well) at 
a 
unitization proceeding is an obligation of the lessee. Of course, the real 
dilemma is when the operator of the well is also the lessee and particularly 
if the lease in question provides for a greater royalty than that affecting the 
drillsite tract. The lessee then has a built-in conflict 
-
his profit increases as 
the percent of participation by the leased premises decreases. In such 
circumstances, a lessee must properly represent the lessor and attempt to 
include as much of the leased premises in the unit as is productive. Given 
the inexact nature ofgeology and since so much ofunitization is a matter of 
interpretation, it is suggested that good records be kept to insure that the 
obligation is fulfilled. This may be fairly easy to do 
-
so long as it is done 
in good faith. Nevertheless, the dissatisfied lessor may have a greater 
incentive to sue because of the potential conflict. True, once the 
Commissioner establishes a unit, it, by definition, establishes the legal 
limits of the production and any attempt to show that more of the leased 
premises should have been included in the unit formed would be considered 
a collateral attack on the Commissioner's order with all the problems that 
entails.52 However, if pleadings are properly drafted to limit a claim to the 
51 163 So.2d 406 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964). 
52 Trahanv. The SuperiorOilCompany, 700 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1983). See also,Savoy 
v. Tidewater Oil Company, 218 F.Supp. 607 (W.D. La. 1963), affdper curium, 326 F.2d 
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fulfillment of the obligation of the lessee to adequately represent the lessor 
at the hearing, a sufficient cause of action against the lessee should be 
recognized, a result which could place the lease in jeopardy. 
An example with which this author is familiar is one where the lessee 
was the operator of an off premises well and there was another tract in the 
vicinity of the well which was unleased and which, it was discovered (based 
on the information obtained from the drilling of the well) should be 
included in the unit, along with a portion of the leased premises. In the 
negotiations between the operator and the unleased landowner, the potential 
unit participation of the unleased tract in the unit was discussed. The 
operator apparently told the unleased owner that he would propose a greater 
participation of that owner's tract in the unit if he leased the land to the 
operator and would do so by rearranging his structure map and other 
evidence, all at the expense of the leased premises. 54 Of course, being a 
matter of interpretation, the operator would presumably justify his action 
by arguing that his ultimate submittal embodied his true interpretation. 
Obviously, this is quite egregious and would certainly be a breach of the 
duty to the lessor to properly protect the leased premises or to act for the 
benefit ofboth lessee and lessor. Granted, the Commissioner and his staff 
simply receive the testimony and independently determine the unit 
configuration. Nevertheless, it is submitted that, as difficult as it may be to 
prove, such action by a lessee is in direct violation of the obligations of 
a 
reasonable and prudent operator and especially the portion of that obligation 
which requires actions be taken for their "mutual" benefit, not to mention 
the "good faith" requirement of Article 122. Furthermore, in viewing the 
obligations of the lessee and determining whether the lessee has complied 
therewith, it has been suggested that the proper method by which to view 
the situation is as if the subject lease was the only lease owned by the lessee 
in the area. Having been involved in unitization matters, particularly, 
representing operators, the author simply wonders (and the question 
is 
posed for your consideration) whether the operator views the situation and 
prepares his evidence in the same manner when he owns leases on all the 
tracts within the productive area as when he owns 
a 
lease on only one. 
The point to be made here is simply that a lessee, particularly one who 
drills an off-premises well in the vicinity of the leased premises, must be 
acutely aware of his obligations to his lessor (or actually to all his lessors) 
53 In Trahan, there is an excellent discussion concerning these very matters. It is 
particularly noted how the court went to some lengths to distinguish situations where the rule 
preventing collateral attacks on the 
Commissioner's 
orders would not bar properly plead 
claims by a lessor against a lessee on the basis of the lessee's obligation to act as 
a reasonable and prudent operator. See, for example, footnote 27 at p. 1025. 
54 The owner ofthe unleased tract and the owner of the leased premises were neighbors 
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to operate for their mutual benefit and insure that he not only complies with 
these obligations but also preserves evidence thereof, because of the 
increased possibility of suit in light of the built-in conflict discussed 
above. 
Another instance closely akin to the foregoing is that of obtaining an 
allowable for the production of and actually producing a well which will be 
unitized. Assume, for example, a party owns leases over the entire 
productive area covered by several leases for a well drilled at a legal 
location on one of the leases. The operator knows that he must initiate 
unitization proceedings to insure that the proper parties receive their fair 
and equitable share of the production. There are several pipelines in the 
area and therefore, the well can fairly quickly be placed in production. It 
takes the lessee/operator some time before the actual filing of the 
proceedings, to, for example, meet with other participants in the well to 
arrive at an acceptable plan for unitization, determine and identify the 
interested parties he must notify, and the like. Of course, the Office of 
Conservation's current rules regarding the issuance of an allowable for 
a 
well provides that if the request therefore is made prior to the filing of an 
application for 
a 
hearing before the Office of Conservation, the allowable 
will be on a lease basis (remember, the well is at a "legal" location, i.e. 
more than 330 feet from a "property" line) and 
if 
the request is made after 
such filing, the allowable will be conditioned on the applicant's agreement 
or obligation to distribute the funds attributable to such production on the 
basis of the equities to be set by the unit ultimately created. This really 
places the lessee in a difficult position. Of course, 
if 
production is 
commenced before the filing, all proceeds will be due the drillsite owner 
(based on the rule of capture) until the effective date of the order. 6 The 
non-drillsite owners, of course, will be deprived of production proceeds 
they would otherwise receive. It becomes even more dif icult when the 
royalty due the various lessors is different for the drillsite owner and the 
others. This exact situation occurred fairly recently in south Louisiana. 
55 The author is aware that the lessee does not have a fiduciary duty to his lessor. The 
court in Trahan,discussed this at length and compared the situation of the lessee's action 
before the Commissioner to that of an attorney representing a client in court and, of course, 
distinguished those situations. It is recognized that sometimes the interest of the lessee and 
lessor at a particular hearing on unitization may vary substantially and a lessor has as much 
opportunity to present evidence at such hearing as the lessee. Therefore, his interest can 
presumably be adequately protected. Nevertheless, the rather extensive discussion of these 
issues in the Trahancase reveals the troubling aspects a court may have with completely 
barring a lessor from asserting these claims and should serve as a warning or at least a guide 
of how to handle matters regarding unitization. 
, 
56 See La.R.S. 30:1 and La.R.S. 30:9. See also, Frost-JohnsonLumber Co. v. Salling's 
Heirs, 150 LA. 756 91 So. 207 (1922); Piercev. Goldking Properties,Inc., 396 So.2d 528 
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), writ refused 400 So.2d 904 (1981); and Desormeauxv. Inexco Oil 
Company, 298 So.2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), writ refused 302 So.2d 37 (1974). 
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The operator was being pressured from both sides. It so happened that 
when all preparations for unitization were finalized, the well had not quite 
been completed, or "hooked-up", and ready for production and, with an 
adjacent owner threatening to initiate the unitization proceedings himself 
and the operator, wanting to be the applicant and gain whatever advantage,
if any, that might have, filed the application for the hearing prior to 
receiving the allowable and therefore proceeds from the date of first 
production was distributed on a unit basis." 
Obviously, there is substantial room for abuse in these circumstances, 
just as there is in connection with the unitization matters previously 
addressed. There is no hard and fast rule governing these situations except 
that of the "reasonable and prudent operator". However, these matters are 
addressed here to show the difficulty that may arise because of this 
obligation of "mutuality". Remember that good faith may be irrelevant if, 
under an objective standard, the action of the lessee is found not to be that 
of a reasonable and prudent operator. Therefore, the author suggests that 
the lessee/operator in this instance not only be aware ofhis obligations but 
also be prepared to defend them. Probably the best solution is to simply 
move forward with unitization and production activities independently and 
allow "the chips to fall as they may". That would seem to be the easiest 
position to defend. 
What about the situation which arose in connection with the Neomar 
Resources, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corporation?58 This author questions 
whether perhaps the lessor in that case may not have had a cause for 
concern and may have been the party who should have complained. In that 
case, Amoco Production Company ("Amoco") owned the leased and had 
subleased the shallow rights to Neomar. Amoco and its partner, Amerada 
Hess Corporation ("Amerada"), drilled a well to the deeper horizons which 
resulted in a dry hole but revealed (by logs) potential production in the 
shallower horizons. Although Neomar requested ofAmoco to take over the 
well, Amerada apparently never responded to Amoco's notice thereof and 
thereafter Amoco simply proceeded to plug the well. Neomar subsequently 
drilled its own successful well to the horizon shown productive in the 
Amoco well and sued Amoco and its partners for breach of contract. 
57 Of course, without agreement from the drillsite owner, it is quite possible that the 
lessee would be faced with the obligation to pay "double" royalties on some portion of the 
production proceeds since he would owe the drillsite owner his full royalty on the entirety of 
the production until the effective date ofthe unit and also to the non-drillsite owners for their 
proportionate share of unit production from the date of first production. In most instances, 
the operator obtains what is often referred to as an "escrow agreement" from the drillsite 
owner to provide for distribution of funds on a unit basis and if the drillsite owner does not 
agree, simply delays commencement of production until the unit is created, which, ofcourse, 
may entail yet additional problems. 
58 648 So.2d 1066 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994); writ denied, 651 So.2d 277 (1995). 
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Neomar claimed that Amoco, et al had breached their obligation to act as 
reasonable and prudent operators. Neomar's suit was dismissed on the basis 
of no cause of action and no right of action. The court said that although 
Amoco (and Amerada) owed a duty to act as reasonable and prudent 
operators, that duty was owed, not to Neomar, their sublessee, but to the 
lessor. 9 However, the question which arises is whether or not the actions of 
Amoco and Amerada breached such duty to the lessor, in that case, the State 
of Louisiana. The State had a productive well on its property that was 
plugged. Could this, under any stretch of the imagination, be considered 
action for the benefit of the lessor, or for that matter, the lessee as well? 
Presumably, by turning over the well, the lessees could have at least saved 
the plugging and abandoning and surface restoration costs. Thus, what may 
have happened was the flip side of the Article 122 coin - the operations 
may have been to the detriment of both lessor and lessee.6 0 Does the 
affirmative statement in Article 122 to act for the benefit of the lessor, or at 
least, the mutual benefit of both lessor and lessee, mean that the lessee 
cannot, therefore, act to the detriment of the lessor? Could the lessor have 
demanded that the well be turned over to Neomar rather than be plugged 
and abandoned? What ifNeomar had not drilled the subsequent, successful 
well, either because of its election not to or its inability to successfully do 
so, by, for example, encountering mechanical or other problems in drilling 
the well to the potentially productive horizon? Surely, the lessor would 
then have suffered substantially. Or perhaps more realistically, what if the 
shallower, presumably productive horizon had been marginal such that the 
party who drilled the well would have produced it, if for no other reason, in 
order to obtain some return on his investment (since he had already drilled 
the well), but could not justify the expenditure of the necessary funds to 
drill a whole new well, based on the log, etc. Thus, the lessor would lose 
production as to which he otherwise would have been entitled. Because the 
lease is an indivisible agreement6 , it would seem that the state could have 
looked to all three of the lessees as having breached the lease because of its 
violation of the Article 122 obligation to act as reasonable and prudent 
operators. If there were equities to be worked out between the lessees, 
could it not be argued that they could not be worked out at the expense 
of 
the lessor? 
59 The court also stated that such an obligation was also owed from Neomar to Amoco, 
as its sublessor, but not vice versa. 
60 The author is aware of some lessees' desire to insure compliance with the plug and 
abandonment and surface restoration requirements of Office of Conservation Statewide 
Order No. 29-B and therefore the corresponding reluctance to turn over operations in a well 
without satisfaction of adequate protection with regard thereto. However, a bond or 
insurance might address that concern. There are specific statutes dealing with an operator's 
limitation of liability for future restoration and the like such as the Louisiana Oilfield Site 
Restoration Law found at La.R.S. 30:80. 
61 Louisiana Mineral Code Article 130. 
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Perhaps the author is influenced in his opinion of the case by what 
seems to be the very questionable action of plugging an otherwise 
productive well, but it seems that the ultimate result was wrong, or rather 
that the ultimate result would have been wrong had the lessor brought the 
action instead ofNeomar. In all likelihood the decision to plug the well was 
made without any, or with very little, thought given to the effect it would 
have on the lessor and the lease itself. It is because of situations such as 
these that the author stresses the importance of the lessee keeping in mind 
the necessity for "mutuality" in oil and gas leases and operations conducted, 
or not conducted, thereunder. 
There are several other situations which could be addressed, but time 
and space prohibit the author from doing so. For example, what about 
split-streaming gas production where the prices paid for the gas to different 
lessees differ? There may be valid reasons for doing so by one of the 
lessees but is this at the expense of the lessor and, if so, is the entire lease 
placed in jeopardy? As a partner in a well as to which production is sold to 
two different purchasers, a lessee should be acutely aware of the potential 
problems this may cause. Additionally, unitizing a leased tract at the very 
end of the term of the lease perhaps for reasons other than conservation 
could cause a lessee problems.62 And what about a lessee's obligations 
regarding the use of secondary or tertiary recovery methods, or a lessee 
farming out a lease in exchange for a guaranteed overriding royalty interest 
of a certain percentage of the entire production from a well regardless of 
subsequent unitization? By posing the questions, the author is not 
suggesting that the lessee must share with the lessor whatever profit he 
makes as a result of his ownership of the lease. However, in view of the 
trend in the jurisprudence toward the "higher" standard imposed on the 
lessee, and particularly the language by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the 
landmark case of Frey v. Amoco Production Co. 
3
, wherein the court 
discussed the obligation of the lessee to share in the "economic benefits" 
derived from the lease (at least as to take or pay contracts and settlements).6 
What the author is suggesting is that situations such as these must be 
addressed very carefully. 
In conclusion, it should be kept in mind that all operations under and 
pursuant to a lease must be conducted for the mutual benefit of both the 
62 Debetazv. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 891 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1990). See also,McDonaldv. 
Grande Corp., supraat Footnote 6. 
63 603 So.2d 166 (La. 1992). 
64 In discussing the "sharing" obligation of the lessee in the "take-or-pay" settlements, 
the Court in Frey, at p. 174, stated that "[t]he lease represents a bargained-for exchange, 
with the benefits flowing directly from the leased premises to the lessee and the lessor, the 
latter via royalty. An economic benefit accruing from the leased land, generated solely by 
virtue of the lease, and which is not expressly negated .. . is to be shared between the lessor 
and the lessee . . ." 
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lessee and the lessor. The lessee does not have to suffer any detriment in 
order that the lessor benefit. However, he cannot act solely for his own 
benefit. It has been this author's experience that lessees often address 
situations with a rather cavalier or at least casual attitude toward the effects 
which certain actions may have on the interest of their lessors. 
Furthermore, it should also be kept in mind that the same relationship exists 
between sublessors and sublessees and therefore, so do the same 
obligations. 5 Perhaps engineering and/or geological decisions may make 
perfect sense from a engineering or geological perspective but may not be 
sufficient, in and of themselves, to meet the objective test of a reasonable 
and prudent operator. It is the duty of the attorney or the landman to be 
aware of these obligations and insure that the decisions made by lessees are 
with due consideration thereof. 
The obvious trend in the jurisprudence, as evidenced above, is to place 
a higher duty on the lessee because of his greater "power" in the lease 
contract relationship, as we can especially see in the Frey and Connell 
cases. Although the relationship is not a fiduciary one, the courts seem to 
be "pushing the envelope" closer and closer to that. It is submitted that the 
lessee, because of his superior and often unique knowledge of all facts in 
dealing with the operations under the lease, is and will continue to be 
expected to "take care" of his lessor. He will be expected to be 
a 
"pere de famille" kind of"good administrator" cited by Judge Rubin in the 
Williams case. 6 With the use of that kind of language, good operators nd 
lessees will realize that the obligations of the reasonable and prudent 
operator will only increase and not decrease. The often heard axiom of"its 
getting just as hard to keep production as it is to find it" is proving to be 
truer in more recent times. However, the smart lessee will heed the warning 
and pay closer attention to the effects of his operation on his lessors. He 
may not like it, but would be foolish to ignore it. 
POOO0- CQCQCQ1CQ 
65 Wier v. Grubb, 228 La. 254, 82 So.2d 
I 
(1955). 
66 Williams v. Humble Oil 
& 
Refining Company, supra, at 414. The term "pere de 
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